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Introduction  
Octavia Butler (1947-2006) published her first novel Pattern-master in 1976, breaking 
into the predominantly white, male world of science fiction. Instead of adopting the concerns 
of the New Wave science fiction authors of the sixties and seventies, however, Butler 
prioritized those issues that concerned her personally as an African American woman and a 
feminist. Whereas New wave science fiction writers were mainly concerned with amending 
the genre’s rather pulpy reputation by implementing strategies of radical conceptual and 
literary experimentation, Butler never wavered far from literary realism and stuck to more 
traditional forms of narrative and plot, while still tackling conceptually complex issues (Birch 
and Hooper). Her work further distinguishes itself from the ostensibly colour-blind, 
sometimes naively utopian New Wave novels in its interrogation of the notions of power and 
agency as situated on the double axis of gender and race. Moreover, Butler’s fiction 
deliberately recalls and recycles the plots and conventions of older genres in a manner that is 
characteristic of postmodernism. The genre that she harks back to most consistently and most 
emphatically is that of the slave narrative.  
She was not the only African American author to pursue this line of thought in the 
seventies. Madhu Dubey writes of “the emergence of a new genre of African American 
literature – the fantastic neo-slave narrative” – in which the novelist “draws on nonrealist 
devices such as time travel and supernatural possession to revisit the history of slavery,”  
allowing the past to literally intrude on the present (345). The objective of the neo-slave 
narrative is to expose the enduring legacy of slavery in America. Its emphasis on the 
continuity of trauma and the long-term consequences of subjection problematizes what Dubey 
writes were “the redemptive accounts of US racial history that began to gain sway in the 
decades following the civil rights movement” (345-46). “The figure of the slave was pivotal 
to the Black Power movement,” but not all slaves were held in equal esteem: whereas 
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historical, rebellious slaves like Nat Turner were extolled “as inspiring models of a 
revolutionary, militarized identity,” fictional, nonviolent characters like Uncle Tom were 
denounced as traitors and collaborators (Dubey 348). 
Butler, by her own account, was troubled by the masculinist bias of the Black Power 
movement as well as by its polarization of the representations of slavery (Yaszek 1057). As a 
result, much of her fiction is dedicated to dismantling the dichotomy between the heroic, 
rebellious slave and the contemptible ‘mammy’, or house slave. One of the ways in which she 
pursues this goal is by dwelling on the complex power dynamics between master and slave, 
which she often reconfigures as “host/parasite interactions” (Shaviro 226). By reconfiguring 
and defamiliarizing the concept of slavery in this way, Butler controversially destabilizes and 
expands it, loosening it from its historical and racial moorings. In doing so she helps develop 
the genre of the neo-slave narrative, whose representations of slavery generally presume a 
historically “stable sense of their referent” (Dubey 345). At the same time Butler’s fiction 
looks to the future just as much as it does to the past, with its fixation on nuclear or 
environmental apocalypse, humanity’s quest for survival and the necessity of compromise. 
Because Butler peoples her novels with a multi-ethnic cast of characters, and often features 
black female characters in the lead, her work has also been considered part of the afro-futurist 
tradition (Donaldson 98).  
No series of novels by Butler has been as disparately received as the Xenogenesis 
trilogy, consisting of Dawn (1987),  Adulthood Rites (1988), and Imago (1989). Jerome 
Gregory Hampton, on the one hand,  praises the series for its accurate portrayal of “African 
American experiences” as well as for considering “the perspective of a universal marginalized 
body” (Hampton 69); fellow writer Charles Johnson on the other hand takes issue with this 
universality in Butler’s fiction (114), arguing that it “plunges so deeply into fantasy that 
revelation of everyday life … disappears” (115). Moreover, the Xenogenesis trilogy has 
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sparked an extended critical debate about the ostensible essentialism in Butler’s work which, 
although fascinating, will not be the focus of this thesis (Zaki 1990, Peppers 1995, Michaels 
2000, Tucker 2007, Lillvis 2010).
1
 Despite, or perhaps due to its controversial character the 
trilogy was reissued in 2000 under the title Lilith’s Brood.  
The plot of the novels depicts a posthumanist dilemma in that it portrays a situation in 
which humanity is required to relinquish its humanist prerogatives to secure its own survival. 
After a nuclear apocalypse the African American protagonist Lilith finds herself imprisoned 
or rescued – Lilith Brood intentionally courts such ambiguities – by an alien species called the 
Oankali, whose “biological imperative” it is to find a partner species with whom to trade their 
genetic material in order to avoid stagnation, overspecialization, and species death (Gomel 
137). The Oankali’s third gender, called the “ooloi”, are the ones who manage this exchange. 
Lilith must collaborate in this intuitively objectionable process of forced miscegenation, and 
accept that she will become the mother of demons, as her biblical name portends, or watch 
humanity face extinction. In doing so she comes to reconsider the humanist virtues of 
autonomy, authenticity, and rationality in favor of the posthumanist virtues of fluidity, 
adaptability, and liminality, qualities which are reconceived as means of access to power in a 
posthuman context. 
Miscegenation and reproductive (un)freedom often feature as themes in Butler’s 
fiction, but nowhere do they manifest themselves as contentiously as in Lilith’s Brood. 
Butler’s fiction itself has been characterized as “miscegenate,” drawing from both familiar 
African American literary traditions such as the slave narrative, as well as speculative fiction 
(Luckhurst, qtd. in Tucker 165). In other words, Lilith’s Brood is fully a text in the Barthian 
                                                          
1
 Butler has been accused of species’ as well as gender essentialism in her work. The accusations of species 
essentialism in Lilith’s Brood often focus on the “human contradiction,” a genetic concern which seems to 
suggest humanity is predetermined to hierarchical behaviour which includes racism, misogyny etc. What tends to 
be overlooked in such accusations is that it is the Oankali who have coined this term, without having witnessed 
the ways that humanity struggles to resist its ‘nature’, sometimes successfully. Thus Butler sets up the notion of 
the human contradiction as uninformed and potentially biased. Criticism of gender essentialism in Butler’s work, 
however is generally more justified.  
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sense: a “multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend 
and clash” (Barthes 1324). Most criticism concerning Lilith’s Brood, however, fails to 
adequately address the discursive tension in the work between two competing discourses: that 
of the slave narrative and that of posthumanism. For example, the alien invasion in Dawn is 
figured in highly contradictory terms. On the one hand it is cast in the historically grounded 
and emotionally charged, racialized terms of American slavery and oppression, on the other 
hand it is embraced as an occasion for a long overdue, radical transformation of the humanist 
subject into a posthuman one. This makes for a very conflicted reading experience. In the 
sequels to Dawn the register of oppression gradually gives way, and thus ultimately, despite 
the trilogy’s obvious investment in the discourse of the slave narrative, Lilith’s Brood argues 
for a posthumanist “reconceptualization and expansion of the humanist subject” that seeks to 
deconstruct the exclusionary markers of rationality, authenticity and self-determination on 
which it is built (Flanagan 13). The question of how these two discourses conflict and interact 
with each other is one that I will engage with at length.   
In a sense the problem of the two competing discourses is similar to the one that 
Victoria Flanagan addresses in her examination of posthumanism and young adult fiction: 
“Underpinning much literature for children especially narratives that engage with the heroic 
or quest paradigm, is a construction of agency based on the principles of individualism, action 
and autonomy” (14). Young adult fiction even more emphatically traces an emancipatory 
narrative where teenagers are often depicted freeing themselves from the yoke of their family 
or community. The same principles undergird the traditional slave-narrative, where 
individualism, autonomy and often rationalism (closely associated with literacy) are presented 
to trump the bonds of slavery and racism. To what extent do these principles uphold in a 
posthumanist context? As I will argue below, the neo-slave narrative, drawing as it does on 
postmodernist theory, is more nuanced about potential means of resistance or agency within 
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networks of power. It acknowledges that the distinction between Nat Turner and Uncle Tom 
is a false one, and that agency, where it is made possible, can take many forms besides violent 
protest. In doing so the genre of the neo-slave narrative already establishes a kind of bridge 
between the discourse of the slave narrative and the discourse of posthumanism. Lilith’s 
Brood takes this development one step further in thoroughly posthumanizing the genre of the 
slave-narrative by rejecting not its goals, which are admirable, but the foundational concepts 
of agency and subjectivity on which it is built. 
This thesis will trace the reconfiguration of those concepts, agency and subjectivity, in 
Lilith’s Brood in conjunction with the trilogy’s themes of slavery and subjection in a 
posthumanist context. Considering the short intervals between the publication of each novel, 
this thesis is also based on the assumption that the trilogy is best analyzed as a whole, which 
its joint publication in 2000 facilitates. Lilith’s Brood can be read as an extended argument in 
favor of a posthumanist reconceptualization of subjectivity based on what is not an outright 
rejection but rather a reconfiguration of three concepts that humanist philosophy posits are the 
foundations of selfhood: rationality, autonomy, and authenticity.
2
 In Lilith’s Brood these 
humanist virtues, which delineate a narrow and exclusionary concept of the human, are 
reconfigured in order to extend to non-human creatures as well. At the same time this 
reconfiguration of subjectivity also more accurately describes the human condition when it is 
exposed in the light of posthumanism and stripped of its humanist pretentions, demonstrating 
that the humanist subject has always been more of a fantasy, rather than an accurate 
description what human experience and subjectivity entails.  
The first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to a contextualization of the two genres that 
Butler develops in her work –the neo-slave narrative and the critical dystopia. It will also 
expound on the rise of posthumanism in the late twentieth century and its special relationship 
                                                          
2
 By authenticity I mean the idea of an integral, original, and unchanging identity that would, for example, fail to 
apply to creatures with artificial intelligence or with composite and changing identities like the Oankali. The 
concept is further fleshed out in chapter three. 
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with science fiction. In the second chapter I tackle the humanist notion of autonomy and 
demonstrate how it is compromised in the first book of the trilogy: Dawn. Rather than 
valorizing self-determination Dawn demonstrates how intricately our freedom of choice is 
tied up with - and may come at the cost of - other species’ freedom of choice. Thus the novel 
generates an awareness of the state of co-dependency in which we live, and makes it one of 
the principles of ethical living. With such an awareness also comes a new sense of self that 
undermines the authenticity of the humanist subject. In the words of Naomi Jacobs, “a 
relational self, unlike the self-contained humanist self, does not premise its free agency upon 
uniqueness or separation, and thus is capable of forming a posthuman autonomy” (7). This 
notion of the relational self as opposed to the authentic humanist subject is the topic of the 
third chapter which focuses in particular on Adulthood Rites. Finally, in chapter four, I will 
demonstrate that, instead of rationality, Imago posits a theory of knowledge and reasoning 
that is based on the logic of the erotic, or the “the certainty of the flesh,” which anchors all 
thought in embodied experience (Belk).  
This thesis thus tackles in three consecutive chapters the three novels of the trilogy, 
each of which is intent on deconstructing a specific humanist foundational concept, 
respectively: autonomy, authenticity and rationality. At the same time the themes of slavery 
and subjection run as a red thread throughout this thesis, at times corroborating Lilith’s Brood 
posthumanist message, at times problematizing it. In keeping these themes foregrounded 
Lilith’s Brood gives full expression to the struggle and danger that accompanies change, 
bravely acknowledging troublesome conclusions, for example, the inevitable inequality that 
haunts all power relations and the necessity of sacrifice.  
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Chapter 1: The Neo-Slave Narrative in a Posthumanist Context 
 According to Dubey, the neo-slave narrative as a genre is still in the process of being 
defined, although it has already been somewhat established by well-known exponents like 
Toni Morrison who cemented the genre’s fantastic turn in the late eighties with her novel 
Beloved. Generally speaking the neo-slave narrative falls back on the “historically specific 
institution of American chattel slavery,” which it aims to describe with historical and 
emotional accuracy and to which it attributes important physical, economic and psychological 
consequences for the lives of African Americans living in the present (345). Detailing the 
social, intellectual and political context out of which the genre was born, Ashraf Rushdy lists 
three major historical developments that were crucial for its emergence in the seventies. The 
first was the rise of the Black Power movement within the civil rights movement which drew 
attention to the persistence of systemic racism and the desperate poverty that continued to 
plague large numbers of African Americans, especially in cities, despite the achievements of 
the civil rights movement.  
The second important historical development also sprang forth from the civil rights 
movement: the shift of consensus historiography to the more politically involved, less 
conservative historical research of the New Left which was initiated when young historians 
saw “history [being] made from the ‘bottom up’” and thus  “began to study it from the bottom 
up,” thereby giving rise to a greater variety of research topics including the history of cultural 
minorities and women’s history, as well as a whole host of new methods and sources that had 
previously gone unused (Rushdy 4). Most importantly for the study of American slavery this 
meant “a renewed respect for the truth and value of slave testimony, the significance of slave 
cultures, and the importance of slave resistance” (Rushdy 4). In the previous years of research 
these factors had been overlooked or grossly misread. Stanley Elkins, for example, argued in 
his controversial study Slavery: a Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life that 
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the closed system of slavery practiced in the U.S. produced a certain slave personality type 
which was docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, and humble but cunning (1959). What 
Elkins disregarded in his research was the plentiful evidence of slave resistance (archival but 
also in testimonial form), which proved the personality type to be a pose rather than an 
accurate character profile, a mask which hid a more complex and substantial slave 
subjectivity. 
The third context for the emergence of the neo-slave narrative in the seventies was the 
publication of William Styron’s novel The Confessions of Nat Turner in 1967 and the 
subsequent debate in which the emergent black intelligentsia launched a critical assault on the 
novel, denouncing it for its “uninformed appropriation of African American culture” and for 
persisting racist black stereotypes (Rushdy 4).  Styron’s novel adopts the formal conventions 
of the antebellum slave narrative, such as a first-person narrator, but African American 
intellectuals argued that the novel was hostile to the plight of slaves and that of their 
descendants. The neo-slave narrative is largely an attempt to “salvage” the genre for the 
benefit of educating people about slavery and its long-term consequences for an entire class of 
citizens (Rushdy 6). Most of its literary ire is therefore directed at people who deny, 
disregard, or otherwise distort the legacy of American slavery. This did not only apply to 
white authors, like Styron, who appropriated African American culture for their own 
advantage, as there was plenty of disagreement about how to remember and represent slavery 
among African Americans themselves. 
In Remembering Generations Rushdy recounts how in the late 1960s American 
activist movements like the “ultra-black nationalist factions of the Black Power Movement” 
began to obsess about notions of purity, creating a political atmosphere “where activists were 
judged by the purity of their motives, the purity of their actions, even the purity of their 
descent” (100-101). The myth of race purity undergirded a new nationalist black subjectivity, 
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thus problematizing the position of mixed-race people within the movement. Rushdy also 
describes how the same factions within the Black Power movement began to foster a 
contempt for past generations of African Americans who had suffered through slavery and 
oppression, without, as the zealous, young activists were keen to think, putting up any kind of 
a fight. A much quoted anecdote by Butler from her college years demonstrates exactly the 
kind of attitude her peers were prone to with regard to their ancestors. She remembers one 
young man saying, “I would like to kill all these old people who have been holding us back 
for so long. But I can’t because I’d have to start with my own parents” (Butler, “Interview” 
51).  
As a child Butler was similarly disturbed by and ashamed of her mother’s 
complacency as a domestic worker (Butler, “Interview” 51). She resented the way her mother 
tolerated the disrespectful tone in which her employers talked about her, even when she was 
within earshot. As Butler grew older, however, she realized that the sacrifices her mother 
made in her working life guaranteed their livelihood and their independence. Therefore, in 
what was largely a reaction against the younger generations’ shame and anger regarding their 
ancestors, she wrote Kindred (1979). In this her fourth novel Butler dives into the themes of 
family, sacrifice and complicity. Kindred poignantly and painstakingly contextualizes the 
experience of American slavery and makes its narrator and protagonist, the wilfully 
independent Dana Franklin, suffer through it by having her travel back in time from the 1970s 
to an 1850s Maryland plantation. There Dana is humbled as she has to learn “the rules of 
submission” that now govern her position as a black woman and a slave (Butler, “Interview” 
51). At the same time, however, in what is a notorious time-traveller’s paradox, she has to 
orchestrate her enslaved forbear’s rape by her white master in order to ensure her survival in 
the present. Dana thus not only has to face the evidence of miscegenation in her family, but 
she has to ensure it happens.  
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The Black Power movement’s highly selective memory of American slavery did not 
only express itself in its choice of heroes and villains – the Nat Turners or Uncle Toms that it 
either extolled or reviled – but it was also characterized by a refusal to acknowledge evidence 
of miscegenation in the past. Miscegenation constituted a problem because it complicated the 
stability and integrity of black subjectivity. The African American writer and historian 
Dorothy Spruill Redford, for example, admits that she was reluctant to trace her ancestors 
because she “could not bear the idea that [she] might have white blood in [her]” (Redford, 
qtd. in Rushdy Remembering Generations 104). At the same time, however, there were 
dissenting voices within the Black Power movement who “chose to emphasize the contingent 
nature of race and the processes behind racial identification,”  arguing that race is a social 
construction rather than an essence derived from the purity of one’s bloodline (Rushdy, Neo-
slave Narratives 21).   
The neo-slave narratives of the seventies demonstrate a great sensitivity to the 
polyphony of the Black Power Movement by leaving room for different opinions about the 
ontology of black subjectivity. Moreover, Rushdy writes that neo-slave narratives “ [insist] on 
intersubjectivity” (Neo-slave Narratives, 231). Their first-person narratives are never 
unambiguous first-person narratives, but always evoke the sense of speaking for a larger 
community, thereby rendering “rugged and autonomous individualism … suspect and 
reactionary”  (231). For example, one of the reasons why Styron’s Confessions was criticized 
so severely was because of his failure to attend to the omissions and silences in the historical 
document he used as a source: Turner’s dictated confession recorded on the eve of his 
execution in 1831. This led Styron to believe and thus to represent Turner as a lone wolf, a 
man who disassociated himself from, and despised, his fellow slaves and whose romantic 
attachments were to white women only – despite the historical evidence that Turner was 
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married to a slave woman, whom he loved enough to entrust her with the documents that 
proved his complicity in the slave rebellion.  
Lilith’s Brood postdates the neo-slave narratives that Rushdy refers to in his analysis 
of the social context that inspired the genre, such as Ishmael Reed’s Flight to Canada (1976), 
or Charles Johnson’s Oxherding Tale (1982). Timothy Spaulding writes that to the more 
recent neo-salve narratives like Butler’s trilogy “the discourse of postmodernism played as 
crucial a role in the development of the texts” as did black cultural nationalism for Rushdy’s 
case studies (3). According to Spaulding, the fantastic or metafictional operations in these 
texts defamiliarize what have become stubbornly conventional representations of slavery, and 
question the authority of traditional, Eurocentric forms of historiography and historical 
fiction. The postmodernism of these postmodernist neo-slave narratives, however, needs some 
qualification. As Spaulding explains, “the postmodernist deconstruction of individual identity, 
cultural cohesion, and objective truth claims posed almost as great a challenge to black 
activism as Eurocentrism had” (14). Therefore, in order to salvage some of the authority – 
which much political activism continues to rely on and which white postmodernism threatens 
to undermine –  black postmodernists advocated the authority of lived experience, which was 
capable of incorporating the many different voices in the black community, but also 
functioned as a tangible foundation for arguments in a political context.  
Spaulding’s notion of the postmodernist neo-slave narrative is essentially focused on 
history and historiography. How then can Lilith’s Brood, a story set in the future, be included 
in the same category? As Spaulding demonstrates himself in his discussion of Samuel R. 
Delany’s science fiction novel Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand (1984), this need not 
be a problem. He argues postmodern neo-slave narratives can project the concept of slavery 
into the future, thereby defamiliarizing it, but not to the extent that we can no longer 
recognize it as historical. In the same way that Eileen Donaldson argues Kindred can be read 
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as a (afro)futurist text because it collapses the future into the present and the past, Lilith’s 
Brood can be read as a historical text because it does the same thing: collapsing the 
distinctions between future, present and past (99). Cathy Peppers has argued convincingly that 
Lilith’s Brood tells four alternative cyborg/feminist origin stories and that in doing so it gives 
a revised account of the history of the human species. Origin stories are important according 
to Pepper because “the kinds of identities we can imagine are dependent on the kinds of origin 
stories we can tell.” 
 Lilith’s Brood specifically revises the biblical origin story that creates men and 
women as male and female, the one subjugated to the other. Lilith, the name alone
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demonstrates that there is an alternative account that exposes the misogynistic oppression 
intrinsic to the story of Genesis. Secondly, Lilith’s Brood revises the sociobiological origin 
story that argues genetics determine identity. Rather, it suggests both nature and culture are 
inherently open to mutation and transformation and that identity is always contingent. Both 
the Oankali and humanity are genetically stereotyped in the novels (hierarchical vs. life 
affirming and altruistic), but both are also seen to break these stereotypes – Lilith in her 
acceptance of otherness, and the Oankali in their decision to approve of a human colony on 
Mars. Additionally, Butler disrupts “the usual origin story of the evolutionary rise to 
dominance of the heroic individual […] through the ruthless competition and survival of the 
fittest” by substituting a different theory (Peppers). This theory posits “that many of the 
microbiotic components of our cells, like the mitochondria, evolved from free-living species 
which later entered into symbiotic relationships.” Finally, Peppers sees Butler applying this 
theory of symbiosis over competition onto the realm of the paleoanthropological by 
suggesting that there is an alternative to the “man the hunter” myth that assumes that human 
nature, and evolution, are unavoidably marked by violence, xenophobia and sexism. This 
                                                          
3
 In ancient Hebrew mythology Lilith was created alongside Adam to be his wife but she was exiled from 
Paradise for refusing to submit to her husband. As a punishment she was to breed with demons and create a 
demon spawn of her own.   
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alternative consists of the “woman the gatherer” theory, which argues human evolution is 
propelled by communality rather than competition.         
Futurist postmodern neo-slave narratives function rather differently from neo-slave 
narratives set in the past or present. In a chapter titled “Beyond Postmodernity” Spaulding 
writes that, 
in their radical displacement of the experience of slavery into the future  
the slave and postslave experience these texts depict have less to do with the impact of 
slavery on black/white relations and more to do with the increased complexity of 
global and multicultural politics, expanded definitions of sexual identity, and vast 
advancements in science and technology. These texts create radical definitions of 
difference, otherness, and humanity in a way that other postmodern slave narratives, 
grounded in the slave experience as they are, cannot. (102) 
It is this aspect of the postmodern neo-slave narrative, the “Beyond” of Spaulding’s chapter 
heading, that that is both the subject of science fiction as well as a major theoretical 
occupation of posthumanism. This philosophical and literary movement can be described as a 
postmodern critique of humanism that takes issue with its conception of man as an 
autonomous, authentic and rational subject, and thus worthy of exceptional privilege with 
regard to other, supposedly lesser creatures. The posthumanist debate is a relatively recent 
one, dating back to the mid-nineties, although its roots can be traced further back to the anti-
humanism of Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and Martin Heidegger, as well as to the 
exploration of systems theory which occurred even earlier, and which was responsible for 
removing “the human and Homo sapiens from any particularly privileged position in relation 
to matters of meaning, information, and cognition” (Wolfe xii).  
The humanist construction of subjectivity dates back to the Renaissance when it stood 
in opposition to the unfathomable and omnipotent power of the Christian God. Humanism 
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owes its longevity to its aspirations, which are grounded in the values of equality, freedom 
and the inherent value of (human) life and dignity. As Wolfe points out, however, the problem 
is that “those aspirations are undercut by the philosophical and ethical frameworks used to 
conceptualize them” (xvi). Humanism reproduces a “normative subjectivity—a specific 
concept of the human—that grounds discrimination against nonhuman animals and the 
disabled” (xvii). This normative subjectivity is derived from humanism’s narrow delineation 
of “agency—the human subject’s right to be self-defining and autonomous […]—and human 
consciousness or self-awareness” (Flanagan 13). The association between authenticity, 
rationality, autonomy, and agency or subjectivity excludes all those who lack these qualities 
from the prerogatives of the humanist subject, such as liberty and freedom from harm. 
Animals are good examples of those creatures that the humanist conception of subjectivity 
excludes, but the list also includes the disabled, children, the elderly as well as the more 
exotic cyborgs, aliens and robots. 
Before I continue it is crucial to differentiate posthumanism from transhumanism as 
well as from the word “posthuman”. “Posthuman” as a noun denotes the “the technologically 
mediated human subject,” the figure of the alien, the cyborg, or the vampire (Flanagan 14). As 
an adjective it describes a world substantially marked by technology and peopled by 
posthuman characters. Posthumanism on the other hand is the name for the body of theory or 
the philosophical discourse that seeks to dismantle the humanist subject. Posthumanist 
literature often makes use of the posthuman as a tool but the two terms are not 
interchangeable. For example, transhumanism, a philosophical movement that developed 
almost simultaneously alongside posthumanism but which is nevertheless very different, is 
just as fixed on the figure of the posthuman even though its tenets are opposed to those of 
posthumanism. As Wolfe explains, transhumanism is “the best-known inheritor of the 
‘cyborg’ strand of posthumanism”  inspired (though not accurately) by Donna Haraway’s 
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seminal work “A Cyborg Manifesto” (xiii). Transhumanism is at odds with posthumanism in 
its valorisation of the posthuman for all the wrong reasons. To view the intervention of 
technology in our subjectivity as an enhancement which, for example, could be mobilized to 
push those human capacities such as reason beyond their ordinary human limits is a 
transhumanist ambition. In the same category we find the use of technology to dramatically 
increase our lifespan or to create ways for us to upload our consciousness in order to achieve a 
kind of virtual immortality.
4
 These ambitions are derived from “ideals of human perfectibility, 
rationality, and agency inherited from Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment” (Wolfe 
xiii). Transhumanism is thus an “intensification” of humanism and not a branch of 
posthumanism proper, or critical posthumanism as it is also called, which is invested in the 
posthuman precisely because it assails those established humanist virtues of autonomy, 
authenticity, and rationality (Wolfe xv).  
Another disambiguation is called for with regard to the term anti-humanism, which I 
used above to refer to the writings of Foucault, among others. Anti-humanism has more in 
common with posthumanism in that both movements launch an attack on the humanist 
conception of the human. The difference is rather more subtle: whereas anti-humanist scholars 
assume the ultimate ‘death’ of the current conception of man and the birth of an entirely new 
subjectivity, posthumanist scholars often define their project as an attempt to reconceptualise 
and expand the humanist subject to include those whose agency it had previously denied on 
the basis of its definition of those qualities that it perceives to make up the foundation of 
selfhood and subjectivity (Flanagan 11). In fact what a posthumanist critique intends to do is 
to subject the notion of humanism to the kind of rational criticism that humanism itself extols; 
it attempts a kind of deconstruction of the humanist, normative notion of man. Posthumanism 
                                                          
4
 In Lilith’s Brood transhumanist tropes are certainly not absent. The Oankali offer the humans they pair with an 
increased lifespan, as well as increased strength and healing. However, these perks serve to facilitate the 
biological merging of the two species and thus rather than sustain or fortify humanist ambitions and privilege, 
they actually undermine them.   
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posits a revised conception of the human by undermining humanist beliefs and virtues: 
autonomy, authenticity and rationality. What this revision exactly entails is still subject to 
debate.  
The notion of posthumanism that I adhere to in this thesis is closely associated with 
the genre of science fiction and thus with forms of narrative. Science fiction enjoys a special 
place in posthumanist philosophy as a kind of conceptual playground where theories or 
concepts may be developed and problematized. Posthumanist science fiction writing thus 
poses an “artistic challenge” according to Elena Gomel because it may involve representing 
the consciousness of a rational non-human creature (3). At the same time it is also an “ethical 
challenge” because it requires an approach to the non-human that does not end up 
corroborating humanist prerogatives (Gomel 3). The trouble with humanism according to 
Gomel resides in the golden rule that is endemic to its philosophy: do not do unto others, as 
you would not have done unto yourself. As an ethics of engaging the nonhuman other, the 
golden rule falls short since it “assumes essential similarity between the moral agents 
involved in the interaction because it presupposes the reciprocal transparency of their minds” 
(Gomel 23). The premise of most science fiction, however, is that alien minds are different 
from human minds, and their morality may not accord with our own. Whereas humanist ethics 
effaces difference, a posthumanist ethics tries to accommodate and engage with it, thus 
deploying the alien encounter as a potential site of transformation and improvement. 
Gomel is generally pessimistic about most literary science fiction because it does not 
adopt the “poetics of radical alterity” that she deems crucial for doing justice to the otherness 
of non-human beings (28). For example, she denounces Butler’s fiction for its adherence to 
traditional genres and plots like the bildungsroman and for not adopting the more numinous 
narrative strategies that she sees in, for example, in the work of Stanislaw Lem. I disagree 
with Gomel’s conclusion, however, that Butler’s portrait of alien difference only makes sense 
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from an allegorical perspective – where the aliens represent an alternative “non-violent, 
maternal, communalist utopia” (137). This understanding of the Oankali as maternal and non-
violent demonstrates the shallowness of Gomel’s reading. She completely disregards the more 
subtle, psychological forms of violence the Oankali practice on a daily basis. Moreover, 
Oankali family structure is so radically different from that of humans because of the existence 
of the third gender that to call them matriarchal reflects a highly simplistic and inaccurate 
interpretation of the text. However, Gomel’s reading of Lilith’s Brood as utopian does expose 
an element of hope and optimism in what otherwise reads like a highly dystopian piece of 
fiction with its themes of extinction, violence and oppression. Belk points out the genre of the 
critical dystopia allows for precisely such ambivalence, giving the reader both a warning as 
well as something to aim for. Quoting Bacolini he writes that critical dystopia’s are “texts that 
maintain a utopian core at their center, a locus of hope that contributes to deconstructing 
tradition and reconstructing alternatives” (373). This alternative in Lilith’s Brood is founded 
on a truly alien ethics which remains difficult for people to grasp – as Foster’s account of his 
students’ negative response to the trilogy attests (143). For one, we do not share the Oankali 
sense organs, and thus the knowledge on which grounds they make their moral choices 
remains mostly out of reach. And even when we are provided with this information by the 
construct focalizers of the sequels, there is still something truly different about the Oankali’s 
respect for life and futurity that is fundamentally posthumanist in nature.  
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Chapter 2: Autonomy reconceived in Dawn 
Autonomy is a quality unique to humankind and therefore one of our most sacred 
prerogatives, or so humanist philosophy would argue. At the root of this conceived sense of 
autonomy there is the notion that humankind is able to overcome its instincts, and to plan the 
course of its life based on the best possible rational choices that safeguard survival (itself of 
course, paradoxically, our most basic instinct). In Dawn this belief is thoroughly checked 
when humanity is faced with a situation that both reveals the state of interdependency in 
which all living creatures find themselves, as well as the difficulty of making rational choices 
if they go against the core humanist values of authenticity and self-determination.  
After a disastrous nuclear apocalypse the protagonist Lilith finds herself waking up on 
an alien spaceship, rescued along with what remains of the human race. The aliens, called the 
Oankali, seem to be the living and breathing embodiments of Julia Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytical concept of the abject in the sense that they defy the comfortable border 
between the self and what is familiar to us, and what is expelled from the self as indescribably 
other. The abject cannot be assimilated into this dichotomy, and as a result it is both repulsive 
and compelling. According to Kristeva, the abject “recalls – psychically – the moment of our 
separation from the womb, an occasion that is simultaneously bloody, painful, traumatizing, 
liberating and beautiful” (Buchanan). Significantly Butler’s first chapter, which recounts 
Lilith’s initial confrontation with the Oankali, is called “Womb.” The Oankali seem neither 
male nor female, and their grey skin is covered in sensory tentacles that writhe uncontrollably 
and make them look like sea slugs. Yet they have roughly the limbs and proportions of a 
human being, having bred themselves to look humanoid to facilitate the first phase of what 
they call “the trade”.  
The Oankali inform Lilith that they have made earth habitable again, but before 
humanity is allowed to repopulate it, they first have to agree to trade with the Oankali. 
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“Slaves?” Lilith asks, perhaps because the demand for slave labor is one reason why humans 
have historically sought to make contact with foreign peoples (Dawn 24). Of course, being 
utterly non-human, the Oankali have never participated in a slave trade; instead they trade 
“the essence” of themselves, their genetic material (Dawn 40). With the help of the Oankali 
third sex, the ooloi, they genetically engineer their progeny to be better adapted, and more 
favorably evolutionarily equipped than their forbears. In order to do so, however, they need a 
constant supply of foreign genetic material and this is where the humans come in. “Your 
people will change,” one of the aliens tells Lilith, “your young will be more like us and ours 
more like you [...]. That’s part of the trade” (Dawn 42). Understandably, Lilith is overcome by 
visions of “grotesque, Medusa children” and objects vehemently (Dawn 42). Her desire for 
species purity is portrayed sympathetically at first, although ultimately it is dismissed as 
destructive and irrational, and contrary to the Oankali way of life.  
The humanity that Lilith is so desperate to defend confirms again and again the 
Oankali verdict that it is beyond saving. According to the Oankali, humans suffer from “a 
mismatched pair of genetic characteristics,” intelligence and hierarchical thinking (Dawn 38). 
Unfortunately the former is too often used to gratify the latter, the older characteristic. Such 
hierarchical thinking, it is understood, is inherently destructive, comparable with ignoring a 
malignant cancer and allowing it to grow. The war that consumed the world originated in this 
set of mismatched characteristics that the Oankali call “the human contradiction.” It is what 
both scares them, and what they find so headily attractive about humans. “They had never 
before seen so much life and so much death in one being” (Dawn 26). Butler’s notion of the 
human contradiction has served as a kind of lightning rod for criticism concerned with 
determinism and essentialism in her work. Are humans really genetically destined for 
extinction? The Oankali seem to think so, although Jhadya, the first Oankali Lilith meets, 
offers a much overlooked afterthought: if the human contradiction is like cancer, there is no 
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reason why humanity should not manage to grow to a venerable old age if it “remember[s] to 
re-examine [itself] periodically” (Dawn 38). According to Butler, self-scrutiny and self-
criticism are crucial for humankind’s survival, and being a writer she seems to have chosen 
literature as a preeminent site for such a means of critical self-reflection.  
Despite the existence of this apparent way out of the human contradiction, its 
manifestations of xenophobia and sexism are as prevalent as ever among the remaining 
human beings that Lilith meets. This becomes painfully obvious when Lilith is almost raped 
by the first man she is allowed to see after her confinement. Moreover, when she agrees to the 
task the Oankali have set out for her, that is, to awaken a group of humans, convince them to 
agree to the trade, and to prepare them for resettlement, her plans are frustrated by their 
violence, racism, sexism and heteronormativity. She struggles to create unity in her group of 
settlers when some of the men target a Chinese-Canadian man because they have decided 
“he’s something called a faggot” and that they “[dislike] the shape of his eyes” (Dawn 159). 
Additionally, she cannot get them to comply with the Oankali mating process because they 
feel emasculated when the ooloi, and not they, are perceived as being in charge during the 
process. They casually resort to rape and scapegoating, branding Lilith as a collaborator and a 
traitor. Why else, they ask, would the Oankali have given her special powers such as her 
increased strength and healing?  
Thomas Foster notes that by portraying Lilith as a “judas goat” (Dawn 67), Dawn 
alludes to “figures from colonial history, specifically the figure of La Malinche or La 
Chingada, Cortes’s native translator and mistress during the conquest of Mexico,” who slept 
with the enemy in the midst of battle, just as Lilith is seen to do when Nikanj, her partner 
ooloi, is fatally wounded towards the end of the novel (145). In order to save it, she takes off 
her clothes and lies down next to it, allowing it to make contact with her body and channel her 
“talent” for cancer to regenerate its lost limb (Dawn 236).  In doing so, Lilith loses the 
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confidence of the settlers and becomes something of a mythical figure to them, a locus of hate 
and blame like La Malinche. Lilith’s choice to help the Oankali (despite her secret, half-
formed ambition to turn on them in favor of the human cause) is deeply disturbing 
considering the way they have manipulated her into forming an attachment to them. The next 
section of this chapter focuses on the Oankali’s means of manipulation and coercion that 
characterize the negotiation of the trade. Butler’s choice to go into so much detail about 
human-Oankali interaction, which she purposefully likens to antebellum slave-master 
interaction is striking. It certainly nuances what would otherwise be a bland posthumanist 
sermon with an account of the difficulty, and the sacrifice that accompanies any change in our 
core value system. For the sake of structural as well as theoretical purposes I have made a 
distinction between two types of subjection. These two types are deprivation and the fostering 
of physical and emotional dependency. The first category is to be interpreted broadly and 
includes social, cultural and epistemic deprivation, as well as physical deprivation and the 
deprivation of futurity. 
 
Trade or Extortion?  
Conceptually, trade implies two equal parties whose interests and desires are equally 
benefitted through the proposed exchange. If one of the two parties benefits more because it 
exploits the latter, then we speak of extortion. One of the main questions that Lilith’s Brood 
poses is whether the Oankali trade is in fact extortionist. The answer to this question lies in an 
examination of the power dynamics between the Oankali and the humans which are highly 
complex and defy our understanding of fairness. What is complex about the Oankali means of 
coercion is that they often alarmingly recall the subjugating practices of antebellum slavery, 
partly perhaps because they are focalized and negotiated by the African American protagonist. 
However, it would be rash to say that the references to antebellum slavery that permeate 
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Lilith’s Brood are merely a kind of interpretive “reflex” on Lilith’s part, as Thomas Foster 
suggests they are (150). Rather, the parallels drawn between the Oankali methods of 
subjection and those of antebellum slavery expose undeniable similarities, fundamentally 
problematizing the relationship between the humans and the Oankali.  
Dawn opens with Lilith waking up aboard a space ship, confined in a cell, completely 
alone and disoriented. This cell has a bathroom, but Lilith remembers when she was not 
awarded that luxury and “had been forced simply to choose a corner” (Dawn 5). She is also 
given some clothes for a change. Peppers likens her awakening to “the African slave’s Middle 
Passage,” during which similar practices of physical deprivation and humiliation served to 
prevent slave rebellions. At this point in the narrative the aliens are nothing more than 
disembodied voices who question Lilith but remain mute when she asks them who they are or 
where she is. Their habit of drip-feeding humans information only when it suits them remains 
constant throughout the trilogy and can be interpreted as a kind of epistemic deprivation. It 
enables them to groom Lilith for the task they have in mind for her by acquiring her consent 
without informing her fully of the consequences.  
Moreover, she suffers from agonizing social deprivation in the first stage of her 
captivity. In order to appease her and to relieve some of her loneliness while she is imprisoned 
(or with the more insidious purpose of testing her maternal instinct – once again the novel 
purposely courts ambiguity) the Oankali let Lilith socialize with a small boy who reminds her 
of the son she has lost. After she has taught him her language, however, they take the boy 
away without any regard for her agony at the separation. During antebellum slavery the 
disbandment of families was the result of buying and selling people as chattel. Specifically the 
separation of mother and child could count on familiar abolitionist denunciations. The 
Oankali’s treatment of Lilith thus immediately rouses the reader’s antipathy towards their 
goals and methods by evoking traditional slave narratives as well conventional tales of alien 
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abduction. Especially when Lilith finds that her bodily integrity has been breached – she has a 
scar running down her abdomen – she begins to wonder “what had been done to her. What 
had she lost or gained and why?” (Dawn 6). The openness of the question invites wild 
speculation on the part of the reader, speculation that quickly adopts a sexual, and gendered, 
dimension for Lilith. When one of the aliens reveals himself to her, her mind immediately 
considers him a sexual threat, as well as a threat to her sanity (Dawn 11). His name is Jdahya, 
and he is there to help Lilith transition from one stage of her captivity to the next.  
Dawn is divided into four chapters: “Womb,” “Family,” “Nursery” and “The Training 
Floor”. The chapter titles are ironic in the sense that all except the last one invoke feelings of 
familiarity and safety that do not in the least correspond to Lilith’s experience of her captivity 
and exploitation. In “Family” Lilith is released from her “cage” and adopted by her alien host 
family, consisting of the male Jdahya, the female Tediin, the ooloi Kahguyaht and their ooloi 
child Nikanj, with whom Lilith is meant to mate once it comes of age (Dawn 30). The 
unfamiliar morphology behind the alien names is a science fiction trope which serves to  flag 
their difference, but it has another use as well. In much the same way that H.P. Lovecraft’s 
carefully crafted alien linguistic paradigm consists of unpronounceable consonant clusters and 
dark, guttural vowel combinations, the Oankali names avoid “terrestrialism” (Lovecraft, qtd. 
in Robinson 128). In the challenge they pose for human vocal organs these names hint at the 
physical otherness of the Oankali. Their difference is therefore not only represented in the text 
but also performed in the language.  
Living with her Oankali family, Lilith finds that she has to familiarize herself with a 
whole list of other exotic practices besides their complicated nomenclature. She adopts their 
vegan diet and is encouraged to learn their language, and although she has left her cell she 
still has to cope with certain restrictions of her mobility. Because she cannot chemically 
manipulate the walls like the Oankali, she needs permission when she wants to leave, and she 
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is not to wander too far or she risks damaging the ship. In this way the Oankali choose to 
foster her physical dependency on them rather than, for example, letting her settle in one of 
the open spaces in the ship. Her confinement becomes highly dangerous when Lilith is 
allowed to meet another human for the first time. His name is Paul Titus and he has agreed to 
follow the Oankali into space instead of staying with the group which is to resettle on earth. In 
exchange he has been given the power to open and close the walls at will. “It’s all trade with 
them,” he warns Lilith, “[a]nd they know how to make you change your mind” (Dawn 92).  
Titus has been negotiating a deal with the Oankali himself: he arranged for Lilith to be 
delivered to him to alleviate his social and sexual deprivation. The exchange presumably 
enables the Oankali to analyze the human reproductive process. When Lilith rejects Titus he 
tries to rape her. The Oankali intervene but they refuse to take responsibility for Titus’ 
behavior; instead they put him back in cryogenic sleep because he attacked his family. Lilith 
counters, “[w]e haven’t got any real family bonds […] He has nothing! He has no one to teach 
him to be a man, and he damn sure can’t be an Oankali, so don’t talk to me about his family” 
(Dawn 101). The Oankali practices of isolation and their disbandment of human families are 
arguably their worst offenses. In their defense, however, it should be noted that a lot of their 
initial mistakes may be derived from a lack of understanding. Nikanj, who is a second-
generation ooloi, is of a different opinion than his parents when it comes to negotiating the 
trade but until he reaches maturity he cannot fully exert his influence.  
Another technique the Oankali practice is cultural deprivation. Lilith is refused 
materials to write with, even when she argues that it will help her learn the Oankali language 
faster. “No. It will be done our way. Not yours,” Nikanj responds. What it means is that they 
will alter Lilith’s memory to make her unable to ever forget anything, never mind how 
precious the ability to forget may be to a traumatized individual like Lilith. Literacy is an 
important theme in slave narratives; it often marks a point of increased self-confidence and 
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empowerment because it allows (ex-)slaves to access the dominant cultural tradition and use it 
to author-ize their experience. Lilith needs to become literate in Oankali, because it is the 
hegemonic language, as well as the dominant cultural medium for  record-keeping. Scholars 
of the slave narrative tradition have argued, however, that the empowerment that literacy 
affords the (ex-)slave is “ambiguous” (Barett 418). Valerie Smith maintains that, although 
literacy allows slaves to voice, disseminate and critique their experience of slavery, to 
celebrate it without qualification is to “pay homage to the structures of discourse that so often 
contributed to the writer’s oppression” (Smith, qtd. in Barett 418). An unqualified celebration 
of literacy in the slave narrative, as I will explain below, reproduces the idea that illiterate 
slaves did not suffer as literate ones did, because they had no access to the hegemonic means 
of expression.  
Frederick Douglass, for example, in contemplating his literacy writes that he 
sometimes “envied” his fellow-slaves “for their stupidity” (2057). “I have often wished 
myself a beast. I preferred the condition of the meanest reptile to my own. Any thing, no 
matter what, to get rid of thinking!” (2057). According to Douglass’s reasoning here, 
illiteracy reduces a person to the status of a beast, a reptile, a non-thinking thing, incapable of 
true suffering. This argument is contrary to his prior valorization of slave songs as a cultural 
means of expression: “[t]he songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart” (2046). It 
would seem, therefore, that in pursuit of the hegemonic cultural tradition oppressed people 
risk turning their back on vernacular forms of cultural expression, although Lilith 
demonstrates that this need not always be the case. In the sequels to Dawn it is mentioned that 
she still writes, despite her phenomenal memory, and sometimes she disappears into the forest 
to escape the claustrophobically tightknit Oankali family structure, regardless of the neuro-
chemical discomfort the separation of ooloi and mate causes them both. “She does that 
sometimes– insists on keeping Human customs” (Imago 528).   
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Lilith’s Oankali literacy is a double-edged blade, but the Oankali manage other kinds 
of cultural deprivation that are less ambiguous. Not only do the Oankali (initially) not allow 
Lilith to keep records in her own cultural tradition, they have also destroyed the cultural 
records of humanity that remained on earth. The Oankali want humanity to “begin again,” in 
places “clean of radioactivity and history” (Dawn 34). The notion that one can be “clean” of 
history is intriguing but also very problematic. The premise of the neo-slave narrative is that 
those who seek to be free of history will find it intruding on them in the present, and that it is 
better not to forget about the past, but to acknowledge its influence over the present. The 
Oankali tactic of eradicating human culture thus seems more like a self-serving way of 
closing the past to the humans, as their own past is “the one direction that’s closed to [them]” 
(Dawn 36). Their destruction of earth’s ruins can therefore be read as another way of coercing 
humanity into acceding to the trade. 
Another method of coercion that the Oankali rely on is fostering physical dependency. 
Lilith’s reliance on the Oankali for mobility pales in comparison to the bond she enters into 
when she aids Nikanj through his transformation into adulthood. Once again the Oankali have 
not informed her that in doing so she seals her relationship with Nikanj with neuro-chemical 
certainty. Once bonded like this, she cannot veer from his side for very long before 
experiencing intense discomfort. They become chained to each other, for lack of a better 
word. In Imago Lilith’s ooloi child Jodahs is faced with a similar moral problem. Should it 
tell its potential mates Tomas and Jesusa that if they stay during the transformation they will 
never leave? They already feel threatened by its chemical influence over them. “It wants us to 
stay and I want to stay and so do you, and we shouldn’t! Something is wrong” (648). In the 
end, however, Jodahs says nothing at all, knowing that one day his mates will “curse [it] for 
[its] silence” (Imago 647).  
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 In an interview in 2001 Butler confessed that she is not sure she achieved what she set 
out to do in Lilith’s Brood, which was to imagine an alternative society that is not founded on 
hierarchy. “I wound up with a somewhat different hierarchical system, chemically controlled 
as with DNA, but, instead, pheromonal” (Butler, “Radio” 54). Because humans are 
themselves not aware of the pheromonal impact they have on other species, only of the 
seductive threat the ooloi pose for them, they appear more vulnerable in the text, but this 
could be merely an illusion springing perhaps from our bias in sympathy towards them. 
Jhadya tells Lilith that the Oankali are long overdue for a partner species (Dawn 42). This 
sense of urgency would explain some of the force behind their strategies of coercion. 
Additionally, their need for this partner species far exceeds anything we could imagine, and it 
is just as crucial for the survival of their species as it is for humankind. Humans and Oankali 
are dependent on each other for survival. Such dependency requires the sacrifice, firstly, of 
the humanist conception of self-determination or autonomy. But it does not require us to 
relinquish the notion of agency entirely.  
 Flanagan writes that in extending the notion of agency to non-human subjects 
posthumanism transforms the way in which we think about those non-human subjectivities as 
well as the way in which we conceive of the notion of subjectivity itself. In her words,  
This broadening of the categories of subjectivity to which agency can be applied also 
involves an ideological reformulation, because humanism has always conceived of 
selfhood in highly individualistic terms. Posthumanism, on the other hand, views 
subjectivity as networked and collective. (21) 
The ramifications of such a networked and collective subjectivity, derived from the 
reconfiguration of autonomy, are worked out in detail in Lilith’s Brood. There is the fact that 
Lilith is singled out to mother the first group of humans to resettle the planet. Her actions 
therefore determine the life of an entire species. As such her autonomy is curtailed because 
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that responsibility narrows down her choices, but at the same time that responsibility gives 
whatever choice she does make profoundly more importance. The humanist principle of self-
determination thus becomes the posthumanist principle of collective determination in Lilith’s 
Brood, where one’s choices are shown to affect the lives of other creatures, and vice versa.  
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Chapter 3: The Relational Subject in Adulthood Rites 
So far I have written about the Oankali’s means of coercion and manipulation. A quick 
summary of the their offenses lists physical and social deprivation, cultural impoverishment, 
and fostering physical dependency. On the topic of reproductive freedom and miscegenation 
(or hybridity) I have, however, remained silent, an omission which I will remedy in this 
chapter. It is important to realize that humanity’s desire for species purity is derived from the 
humanist notion of authenticity. Of the three concepts of humanist philosophy that I discuss in 
this thesis authenticity is probably the most unclear. The notion of the authentic human 
subject is informed by ideas of wholeness, integrity, originality, and coherence. It is based on 
the presupposition that the human subject is unified, and singular, and not composite or 
derivative. Unsurprisingly, this conception of the human mind and consciousness is illusory. 
Our consciousness is always changing in response to its environment. Such a socially 
constituted subject is at the center of Adulthood Rites, but before elaborating on the ways in 
which Butler’s science fiction epic challenges notions of authenticity, I will address the 
problem of miscegenation and reproductive freedom in the context of slavery. 
In the second book of the Xenogenesis trilogy the Oankali follow up on their plans to 
create a hybrid society and a hybrid race, and to secure this hybrid future they punish all 
resister humans with sterility. According to their logic and their reverence for life, it would be 
a worse sin to allow humans to breed amongst themselves and thereby maintain a species that 
is doomed to extinction. “To them it’s like deliberately causing the conception of a child who 
is so defective that it must die in infancy” (Imago 532). Sterility too can be conceived of as a 
kind of deprivation: the deprivation of futurity. The resister humans have different ways of 
responding to their situation: some, for example Lilith’s new lover Tino, cross over to the 
trader villages where the Oankali and humans live alongside each other, some reciprocate by 
abducting human-Oankali offspring – so-called constructs – and others decide there is no way 
36 
 
out of the double bind  and choose death instead.  Adulthood Rites recounts the story of Akin, 
Lilith’s construct son, who is abducted by resister humans as a baby. Growing up in their 
villages he comes to sympathize with their desire for independence. The novel ends with 
Akin’s successful appeal to the Oankali to let the resister humans opt out of the trade and start 
their own colony on Mars, even though it goes against the Oankali’s nature and ethics to do 
so.  
In Dawn Lilith was told that the Oankali intend to mate with her and with the other 
remaining humans, but not until they consent to do so. Nevertheless, Dawn ends with 
Nikanj’s revelation to Lilith that he has made her pregnant with her dead lover’s child against 
her will, or at least, against her expressed volition. Nikanj tells Lilith that “nothing about [her] 
but [her] words reject this child,” implying that he acted in response to a kind of non-verbal, 
bodily expression of her desire for a child (Dawn 247). The Oankali’s presumptions about 
humanity’s physical inclinations and desires (the prime example being the human 
contradiction) are highly problematic because they echo the racist, pseudoscientific biological 
theories that undergirded the subjugating practices of antebellum slavery, when miscegenation 
was an inevitable consequence of the institution of slavery in the United States. Because the 
children who were born to slave women, whatever their paternity, automatically became the 
legal property of their mother’s owners, sexual abuse was both an accepted expression of 
slave ownership and an economically profitable pursuit. As Frederick Douglass’ 
autobiography testifies, sometimes female slaves were kept as “breeders,” and spared hard 
labor in order to bear children, increasing their owner’s bio-capital (2067). Sadiya Hartman 
eloquently describes how the carefully truncated construction of the female slave’s 
subjectivity was designed to eliminate the possibility of rape. Given the conceived 
lasciviousness of the black woman, sexual abuse never really amounted to rape, nor could it, 
since to give or refuse consent, slaves had to be in possession of agency that they were 
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routinely denied. Black female subjectivity was therefore culturally and legally constructed as 
“both will-less and always willing” (81). Nikanj’s preoccupation with Lilith’s willing flesh, as 
opposed to her spoken refusal echoes such a racist violation of her agency.  
There is another parallel between Hartman’s analysis of antebellum slavery’s 
construction of black subjectivity and the Oankali’s treatment of its partner species. In her 
discussion of a legal case in which a slave called Alfred was accused of the murder of the 
white man who had raped his wife Charlotte, Hartman points out that the defense focused on 
the husband’s violated marital rights, rather than on the rape itself. Nevertheless the husband’s 
rights were waived because the deceased was white. Hartman explains:  
on the one hand, the management of slave sexuality translated the rape of slave women 
into adultery or sexual intercourse; on the other, it refused to recognize or grant any 
legitimacy to relations forged among the enslaved. (Hartman 85) 
A similar denial, or at least a similar refusal to acknowledge  and respect inter-human 
romantic relationships characterizes the Oankali treatment of their partner species. In what is 
once again a perfect example of the way they carefully manage the flow of information, Lilith 
only finds out after she has slept with Nikanj and her human lover Joseph that she cannot 
touch the latter anymore. Forming the tripartite Oankali bond means giving up physical 
intimacy between male and female partners except when it is channeled and mediated 
neurologically by the ooloi. It is perhaps because of this requisite mediation that Lilith comes 
to think of the ooloi as “the head of the house” (Dawn 48), and it explains Titus’s observation 
that the “ooloi let everyone know who’s in charge” (Dawn 89).  
 There is no doubt the ooloi possess an inordinate amount of influence over both 
Oankali and humans because they govern the sexual lives of both species. The ooloi’s talent 
for seduction is arguably the most effective Oankali method of coercion because it does not 
seem to be a method of coercion at all but rather one of persuasion. Still, Lilith is wary of the 
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ooloi’s seduction as her allusion to their reproductive organs, a second set of arms which 
resemble elephant trunks, reveals. She likens them to a noose as they curl around her neck 
(Dawn 158). It seems that her sexual attraction to the ooloi is haunted by the threat of 
lynching – which was historically legitimated by the accusation of the rape of white women. 
The image serves as a warning that her willing miscegenation with the Oankali may cause 
trouble for her within a human cultural paradigm that cherishes race and species purity. And 
she does get into trouble for ‘sleeping with the enemy.’ Nevertheless,  
Nikanj could give [Lilith] an intimacy with Joseph that was beyond ordinary human 
experience. And what it gave, it also experienced. This was what had captured Paul 
Titus, she thought. This, and not sorrow over his losses or fear of a primitive Earth. 
(Dawn 161) 
In Lilith’s Brood the majority of humans succumb to the seduction of the Oankali which is 
centered around this mutual, erotic bond that the ooloi help establish between the mates of 
both species. The role of consent within the power structures that govern the reproductive 
landscape, however, needs to be considered closely.  
Alys Eve Weinbaum reads Butler’s work as a “proleptic critique” of the neoliberal 
reproductive landscape of the new millennium which is characterized by “self-disciplining 
and ultimately self-exploiting subjects,” in other words, docile subjects who have interiorized 
authority and act as their own overseers, consenting to their own subjection (49). Weinbaum 
contrasts this new reproductive dystopia with the old one that played out according to 
“predictable racial hierarchies,” where black women’s reproduction and childrearing were 
“pathologized and devalued” (49).  Butler’s critique according to Weinbaum consists of 
exposing the historical continuities between both paradigms. In her own words,  
the emergence of the same self-governing neoliberal subjects who will be associated 
with the “new reproductive dystopias” of neoliberalism and thus that those whom 
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Butler portrays as “consenting” to their exploitation exist side by side with those who 
are forcibly enslaved and rendered disposable. We discover, in other words, that there 
are no postracial reproductive worlds or “free” subjects. (Weinbaum 51) 
Although Weinbaum does not discuss the trilogy specifically, many of her conclusions are 
relevant for a reading of Lilith’s Brood, where humans are neither free to reproduce nor 
denied the right of reproduction; rather, reproduction is always controlled. Halfway through 
Adulthood Rites Akin spends some time on the Oankali ship that was the setting for Dawn. 
On the ship he learns more about his Oankali heritage and also about the reproductive 
prospects that he has to look forward to. Since the Oankali presume humans are a polygamous 
species, they have designed construct males to wander outside of the family unit too. Akin is 
aghast at this projected future for him. “He could not imagine such a life. It was not Human or 
Oankali. How could he be able to help the resisters if he were so solitary?” (Adulthood Rites 
445). Here Akin makes an important realization: “You controlled both animals and people by 
controlling their reproduction – controlling it absolutely” (Adulthood Rites 447). This thought 
comes to him without any explicit judgement, and yet it reads like a condemnation of the 
Oankali’s practices if we take Akin’s sympathy for the resisters into account.  
Nonetheless Butler is more ambivalent about this new reproductive dystopia than 
Weinbaum suggests. She never denounces it overtly, but only seems to do so implicitly by 
inviting a comparison between the former explicitly racist, and the new neoliberal, paradigms 
of reproductive culture. And yet the problems resulting from the neoliberal dystopia do not 
seem to be deal breakers for Butler because the Oankali also offer a way out of a desperate 
situation where humanity is headed for extinction. Foster writes with regard to the human-
Oankali power dynamic that the “unevenness of this mutual dependence generates resentment, 
and that resentment results in a desire to escape the framework of the trade rather than to work 
within it to redress these inequalities” (144). Butler suggests that this is not the right way to 
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settle conflict, but that an ongoing engagement with otherness, even if it challenges one’s 
sense of justice, may lead to a more equitable compromise.  
  
Challenging Notions of Authenticity 
Adulthood Rites challenges the humanist notion of authenticity through its close 
focalization via Akin, who defies the idea of a singular, coherent, unchanging subjectivity. As 
the resisters hide out in their rainforest strongholds on planet earth, they build entire villages 
without being able to populate them: “We die and die and no one is born” (Adulthood Rites 
355). As a way out of the deadlock the resisters kidnap and trade fertile construct children in 
the hope of populating their villages. Akin is kidnapped because he looks startlingly human, 
and because boys born to human mothers are very rare; their birth was postponed by the 
Oankali because human males seem much more prone to the effects of the human 
contradiction than females (here Butler’s gender essentialism rears its head). A small mistake 
by an ooloi could have disastrous consequences. Fortunately Akin turns out to be very similar 
to his sisters, having a human sense of individualism and an unquenchable thirst for otherness 
that is part of his Oankali heritage. Despite the hybridity of his species he makes for a very 
familiar focalizer; Gomel singles out this aspect of Butler’s fiction as inimical to the 
posthumanist project, but scholars have argued that there are different ways of narrating 
posthumanity effectively. Nayar for example states that “fictional depictions of the posthuman 
subject [...] are generally confronting not because this subject is portrayed as an ‘alien other,’ 
but precisely because of its familiar, human shape” (Flanagan 60). Akin’s familiarity hints 
that posthuman subjectivity is not inaccessibly alien, but that it is only a more accurate 
description of the human condition when we regard it without humanist goggles. 
Paradoxically, it is the human tendencies in Akin’s character that baffle his Oankali parents, 
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demonstrating that even for a species with such a long, diverse history as theirs, the trade 
comes with its struggles and frustrations (Adulthood Rites 421). 
Akin’s abduction could not have come at a worse time. Like all constructs his mental 
development far outpaces his physical development and so he is like a full-grown child in a 
baby’s body, helpless and conscious of it. Moreover when he is in the hands of his abductors 
he misses the birth of his sister by his Oankali mother, the sibling he was destined to be paired 
with as is the custom in Oankali (and now hybrid) society. At least, if he had grown up 
alongside her she would have matured into a female form to complement his maleness,but 
now that he is missing her he can no longer be sure. Constructs are extreme examples of 
relational subjects. Because siblings often pair with a non-related ooloi to form a new family 
unit, they grow up completing each other in terms of gender and sexuality. This does not 
mean that their sense of gender solidifies after transformation. Children remain in possession 
of both male and female sides no matter what sex they become (Adulthood Rites 314). As a 
result of the failure to bond with his sibling, Akin focuses his attention on the resisters 
instead, “a compensating obsession” that turns out to have species-wide consequences as Akin 
becomes a mediator between two species and a spokesperson for the resisters in much the 
same way that his mother was, determining their collective fate (Adulthood Rites 426). His 
bond with the resisters is just as constitutive of his subjectivity as his genetic inheritance. 
Akin explains that the constructs who were born aboard the ship and never interacted with the 
resisters “could have little reason to pay close attention to their own Humanity,” but because 
he did he has become a perfect mediator between the two species (Adulthood Rites 471). 
Hampton points out that Adulthood Rites reworks the “cliché of the tragic mulatto” 
and reconfigures hybridity as a means of access to power and possibility (67). He writes that 
“by forging such close ties between the hybrid and the tragic, [the cliché] forecloses other 
possibilities of a potentially utopian nature that might also be explored under the sign of the 
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hybrid” (67). In Adulthood Rites this trope is definitely overturned as Akin’s hybridity serves 
to navigate and mediate conflict, and works towards forging mutually acceptable 
compromises. This does not mean his hybridity is entirely unproblematic, but it is made quite 
clear that these problems stem from humanity’s cultural values that are derived from a 
humanist obsession with authenticity. Consequently Adulthood Rites steers clear from 
“[writing] tragedy onto the body of the mixed-race person,” instead pointing to society as the 
source of the problem (Hampton 76). Despite Akin’s deceptively human looks, his hybridity 
is registered in his highly contradictory emotional responses, for example when he is faced 
with the pain of one of his abductors, Damek, the one who attacked his surrogate father Tino. 
“One part of his mind screamed for an ooloi to save this irreplaceable Human [...]. Another 
part of his mind hoped Damek would die” (Adulthood Rites 357). Akin finds he constantly 
has to manage these conflicting parts of himself, human and Oankali, but as much as they 
cause him trouble, they also enable him to make better decisions, which is apparent from 
Lilith’s advice to him: “When you feel a conflict, try to go the Oankali way. Embrace 
difference” (Adulthood Rites 329). In the end that is just what he does and what the Oankali 
seem to be incapable of doing. He embraces humanity including all its terrible traits and 
inclinations and he secures for it another chance at a future.         
Akin’s identity crisis can be figured in terms of W.E.B. Du Bois’ concept of “double 
consciousness,” a common theme in African American literature and art. Within an African 
American context the term refers to a kind of conflict within black subjectivity as the result of 
always having to view oneself through the prejudiced eyes of white others, generating tension 
between “a black identity and an American identity that seem incompatible” (Wallach 265). 
Akin, too, experiences this problem. Because of his Oankali heritage he can “see the conflict 
in [humanity’s] genes,” but because of his recent experience with sympathetic humans he also 
realizes that “they didn’t have to destroy themselves. They certainly don’t have to do it again” 
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(Adulthood Rites 378). He also addresses an unfairness that was blatantly ignored in Dawn: 
although the Oankali section off a group of their species – the Akjai – who never enter into 
the trade in order to secure the species’ future should the trade fail, humans are not allowed 
this privilege, for no other reason than that the Oankali deem it unethical to let such a self-
destructive species live. Akin resists this decision and dedicates his life to establishing the 
resisters as “Akjai Humans” (Adulthood Rites 467). He thinks that the Oankali may have been 
too hasty in their characterization of humanity as irrevocably flawed – and the trilogy 
suggests he is right, as Lilith’s Brood focuses mainly on those humans who present the 
exceptions to the rule: humans who are self-sacrificing and tolerant of otherness and who 
form equally strong family ties as the Oankali are wont to do, for example Lilith’s former 
friends Tate and Gabriel. 
The last way in which Akin, and the Oankali more generally, defy the humanist notion 
of authenticity is by their way of communication. Despite Akin’s human exterior he possesses 
the Oankali sense organs that allow him to pierce or “taste” humans and analyze their genetic 
make-up, as well communicate with other Oankali via “multisensory images” (Adulthood 
Rites 260). This ability to transmit feelings and images via an interlinking of the Oankali 
tentacles reminds of Teresa Brennan’s work on human affect, The Transmission of Affect 
(2004), in which she critiques the modern, Western psychological notion that the self is 
characterized by “affective self-containment” (2). Brennan rejects this theory by suggesting 
that we are porous beings instead, whose affects may very well be derived from somewhere or 
someone else. She argues that we must become aware of the way that affects influence our 
lives by way of “discernment” or “living attention” (139).  
Extending attention into the flesh is simultaneously an exploration of the affects that 
have captured both individual souls as well as crowds of souls, and in this exploration 
there is an acknowledgement and a coming to terms with what the ages of reason and 
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individualism have excluded from consciousness. This is the connection, affectively 
and energetically, to other living and dead things. (161) 
The Oankali are masters of affective discernment. They are aware of their precarious place 
within an ecology and the complicated rules of interdependence that determine their survival. 
And one need only look at the way they live symbiotically with other creatures (their previous 
partner species, or the home entity Lo) to realize their affinity for connection.  
Akin’s story therefore presents a challenge for the humanist notion of authenticity 
because it shows that environmental factors (growing up on the Oankali ship or in Phoenix, 
the resisters’ stronghold) exert a strong influence on the development of one’s personality. 
Moreover Akin’s species-hybridity plays a crucial part in his coming to understand the human 
plight. By embodying the human as well as the Oankali, Akin has come to a conclusion 
different from one that a full-blooded Oankali could come up with. In his address to the older 
generation of Oankali Akin says, 
If your flesh knows you’ve done all you can for Humanity, their flesh [that of human-
born constructs] should know as mine does that you’ve done almost nothing. Their 
flesh should know that resister Humans must survive as a separate, self-sufficient 
species. Their flesh should know that Humanity must live. (Adulthood Rites 471) 
This notion of the knowing flesh is an important concept that will be the subject of further 
scrutiny in the next chapter, but for now it suffices to say by embodying both human and 
Oankali subjectivities Lilith’s Brood’s constructs, or mulattoes, demonstrate that liminality 
and hybridity can be used as means of access to power, the power to bridge differences and to 
achieve change.  
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Chapter 4: Dismantling Mind-Body Dualism in Imago 
The final concept discussed in this thesis is the notion of rationality as it is understood 
in humanist philosophy. Rationality is important because, as I explained in chapter two, it 
subtends humanism’s faith in autonomy. Rationality is a quality that is thought to spring forth 
from the mind and enable humankind to transcend its base, animalistic instincts. It has 
therefore been traditionally conceived of as opposed to the body and emotion. The concept 
has also been both implicitly and explicitly gendered as Western and male, just as nature and 
the body have been traditionally associated with things female. Consequently, it may be 
argued that women and non-white people have never had full access to rationality or to the 
narrow category of the human that it delineates.
5
 In Lilith’s Brood this gendered notion of 
rationality is undermined by a thorough questioning of the mind-body dualism that provides a 
foundation for it. This chapter will focus on the third book of the trilogy, Imago, because it 
contains the most persuasive account of an alternative epistemology that is instead founded on 
embodied knowledge, as well as an erotic experience of the world.  
The title Imago refers to the biological term for the final stage of an insect after its 
metamorphosis. The title is well chosen for a novel whose protagonist, an ooloi construct, 
embodies the final stage of the Oankali-Human trade. With the birth of the ooloi constructs, 
the new Oankali lifeform is able to procreate on its own without help from the previous 
generation’s ooloi. Unlike Dawn and Adulthood Rites, Imago is narrated from a first-person 
perspective. There is both a practical reason for this choice of narrative strategy – keeping the 
use of the gender neutral pronoun “it” to a minimum – and a more compelling reason: 
creating a more immersive experience of posthuman subjectivity. The protagonist of Imago is 
                                                          
5
 Shelly Ortner accounts for the “pan-cultural second-class status” of women by positing that “women are being 
identified or symbolically associated with nature, as opposed to men, who are identified with culture. Since it is 
always culture’s project to subsume and transcend nature, if women were considered part of nature, then culture 
would find it “natural” to subordinate, not to say oppress, them” (73). As for non-white people, Edward Said has 
argued extensively how they are feminized in imperial discourse for example by colonialists and missionaries – 
thus rendering their social status similar to that of women. 
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another child of Lilith’s. Jodahs is expected to grow up male, as “the Human-born rarely 
change their apparent sex,” but, as it turns out, it identifies most with its ooloi parent and thus 
it becomes ooloi itself (Imago 533). In order to contain this potentially catastrophic situation 
Jodahs and his family are exiled in the forest where Jodahs, who does not yet have full control 
over his powers, cannot hurt anyone or anything. Here Jodahs learns to use its talent for 
genetic manipulation and spontaneous regeneration (the most concrete result of the human-
Oankali trade), and manage the intoxicating attraction that exists between it and the humans 
that cross its path, among whom are Tomas and Jesusa, siblings who belong to a group of 
humans who have managed to keep themselves hidden from the Oankali to procreate 
independently. Because of the small gene pool, however, Tomas and Jesusa both suffer from 
debilitating hereditary illnesses. Nevertheless they are forced by the “smooth-faced” elders 
(sterile resisters whose aging process has been slowed and who don’t suffer from tumors) to 
have child after child in order to strengthen the numbers of the independent colony to which 
they belong (Imago 627).  
Tomas and Jesusa are torn between their loyalty to their people and their love for 
Jodahs, who manages to persuade them to stay with it as it goes through its final 
metamorphosis. It does not say that afterwards they will not want to leave, nor indeed will 
they be able to; the neurochemical bond between the ooloi and its mates cannot be broken 
once it has been established. However, Ooloi who do not bond at all face an even worse fate, 
as is demonstrated by what happens to Aaor, Jodahs closest sibling. Without mates to balance 
its metamorphosis, Aaor’s body wanders and slowly starts to disintegrate, becoming less and 
less complex until “Aaor as an individual would be gone. In a way then, Aaor’s body was 
trying to commit suicide” (Imago 682). In order to save it, the party of four goes back to 
Jesusa’s and Tomas’ resister colony to try and find mates for Aaor, but also to save the people 
there from certain death, as staying on earth is simply not an option. Earth will be consumed 
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by the Oankali space ships after a couple of hundred years, whether or not the resisters are 
successful in defying the human contradiction. Once they arrive at the town Jodahs and Aaor 
ara imprisoned but gradually the ooloi substance works its magic and people are persuaded 
that life with Oankali or construct mates is not as repulsive as they had imagined it. The novel 
ends with Jodahs planting a new home, sensing “the tiny positioning movements of 
independent life” of the little seed, thereby securing the future for Oankali and human alike 
(Imago 746).  
For a science fiction trilogy to launch an assault on the notion of rationalism is more 
significant than it may seem because science fiction has a reputation of being an eminently 
rational genre, a genre “whose impact is primarily intellectual rather than emotional” (Gomel 
3). The reputation of science fiction as primarily expository, and conceptually daunting but 
not in the least affective, however, only seems applicable to a small selection of literature – 
so-called hard science fiction. Moreover the use of science in this subcategory of fiction is not 
neutral: “the master narrative of science has always been told in sexual terms, [representing] 
knowledge, innovation and even perception as masculine” (Attebery, qtd. in Donaldson 96). 
Technology is all too often coded as male, subjugating a dangerous, chaotic natural world that 
is habitually coded as female. There are good reasons, therefore, why female science fiction 
authors resort to different representations of technology, or choose to disregard it entirely. 
Instead of representing technology as a mechanical tool used to manipulate the natural world, 
Lilith’s Brood represents it in terms of organic symbiosis, and the secret to the Oankali’s 
technological success is not based on manipulation but rather on communication.  
The Oankali are genetic engineers but their laboratories are their bodies. Consequently 
their manipulation of organic matter occurs not without risk for their own safety. This is one 
of the reasons why, arguably, it is done with a more ethical regard for its consequences for 
various different life forms. Additionally, the Oankali definition of progress is radically 
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different from the humanist notion of progress, which is closely intertwined with rationality. 
Sometimes these definitions clash in Lilith’s Brood as when Tino first enters the trading 
village in Adulthood Rites and remarks with rage and disappointment: “You live like savages! 
... How can you live this way!” (Adulthood Rites 280). Coming as he does from Phoenix, 
where the resisters pour all their energy into building towns, he is surprised to find the 
Oankali living in sober dwellings, using only the most basic tools. Little does he know the 
Oankali are creating a brand new species, and growing a spaceship right underneath their feet. 
The villages they live in are entities which will eventually mine the earth for all its resources 
and leave it barren and uninhabitable when they lift up into space and propel the Oankali into 
the future.  
The Oankali’s interaction with these entities is different from either a soulless 
manipulation of machinery or a heartless exploitation of their skills and capacities. In the 
words of Dichaan, Akin’s Oankali father, “they’re more than partners to us... We build them. 
They are us, too, you know” (Adulthood Rites 441). In fact even the word “symbiosis” does 
not cover the nature of the bond between the two species. The spaceship entities were mixed 
from Oankali DNA and communication is possible between the two life forms in the form of 
the multisensory images that the Oankali also use to communicate amongst themselves. In 
this way the Oankali can experience what it is like to hurtle through space, guided by 
gravitational forces and longing for “the wet, rocky, sweet-tasting little planet” called earth 
(Adulthood Rites 440). The kind of special appreciation for earth as an oasis of life in a 
desolate universe is intensified by this communicative bond. In the next section of this chapter 
I will argue how the affective, nature of Oankali communication may be employed to subvert 
the humanist notion of rationality using two theories of the erotic by Audre Lorde and Gilles 
Deleuze. 
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“A Certainty of the Flesh:” An Epistemology of the Erotic  
 There are two theories of the erotic that are relevant to the kind of experientiality that 
is portrayed in Imago, and to a lesser extent in Adulthood Rites and Dawn because of their 
slightly less immersive narrative structure. One stems from Audre Lorde’s essay “Uses of the 
Erotic: The Erotic as Power” (1984) which is remarkably accurate in describing the Oankali’s 
cultural practices and politics as well as their idea of knowledge. In this rather polemical 
essay Lorde argues for a reconceptualization of the concept of the erotic that breaks with the 
way people have been taught to suspect and vilify it all their lives. She conceives of the erotic 
as a kind of creative energy, “a source of power and information” springing from a “deeply 
female and spiritual plane” (277). In patriarchal societies this source of power has been 
devalued and perverted to the direct detriment of women. A significant move in her argument 
is to expose the artificial separation of the erotic from all other areas of life except sex. 
Instead, her consideration of the phrase “It feels right to me” posits the erotic as an 
epistemological tool. In her own words, “The erotic is the nurturer or nursemaid of all our 
deepest knowledge” (280). Significantly, Lorde defines the erotic as a kind of deeply 
embodied, “nonrational knowledge” that functions in two important ways (278). Firstly, it 
provides “the power which comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person” 
(280). The power derived from sharing joy, sadness, or support builds an understanding which 
can serve to bridge even the most extreme differences. In Oankali culture this erotic sharing 
of affect and purpose between partner species is indeed inherent in the trade, for by entering 
into the trade both species come together in their pursuit of life and futurity, while at the same 
time opening the affective channels of communication between them. 
The second function of the erotic according to Lorde is “the open and fearless 
underlining of [one’s] capacity for joy,” an experience which she describes as the stretching 
open of the body and becoming aware of its innermost rhythms (280).The political aspect of 
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this function is that with this intensification of one’s capacity for joy, one expects nothing less 
of the world than to fulfill it. Hungry for joy, hungry for life, this is how the Oankali 
experience the world. Because they are much more sensitive to the potential of life, they are 
also more severe when its potential is betrayed. Lorde writes that humans, women especially, 
have been “raised to fear the yes within [themselves], [their] deepest cravings” (281),  and this 
is demonstrated time and time again in Lilith’s Brood when humanity says one thing but 
means another, as when Lilith’s words reject her first child by Nikanj, but only her words. The 
Oankali channels of communication comprise other means besides language. This is 
responsible for much of their ostensibly reprehensible conduct, which is actually the result of 
a kind of miscommunication.  
[T]he ooloi perceived all that a living being said – all words, all gestures, and a vast 
array of other internal and external bodily responses. Ooloi absorbed everything and 
acted according to whatever consensus they discovered. Thus ooloi treated individuals 
as they treated groups of beings. They sought consensus. If there was none, it meant 
the being was confused, ignorant, frightened, or in some other way not yet able to see 
its own best interests” (Imago 553) 
It is not surprising that humanity as a whole and on the level on the individual has difficulty to 
form a consensus considering the rigid mind-body dualism that subtends the humanist idea of 
the human, and which forecloses the knowledge of the erotic that comes so naturally to the 
Oankali.  
 As Nolan Belk has argued, however, it is not simple for humanity to survive in “a 
universe where in the hierarchy of experience logic is secondary to the power of the erotic” 
(370).This is mainly because the Oankali experience the world through a radically alien 
sensorium that enables them to know things with “A certainty of the flesh” (Adulthood Rites 
478). Belk remarks how the Oankali experience the world with their entire bodies, and talk of 
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it in a highly sensual language, referring to it in terms of taste, smell and tactility where 
humans would resort to mere vision. The Oankali’s specialized perception both problematizes 
and facilitates communication between the two partner species: because humans lack it, they 
cannot fully understand, let alone accept, many of the Oankali’s decisions. When a construct 
desperately exclaims, “If they could perceive, they would know!” Akin responds bitterly, “If 
they could perceive, they would be us” (Adulthood Rites 377). Lilith’s Brood accurately 
demonstrates that one’s manner of experiencing the world determines the moral choices that 
one makes. All the Oankali can do is approximate the experience of their flesh, try to share it, 
in projected sensations as well as in words. Akin explains, “It isn’t like reading words on a 
page. They feel it and know [the human contradiction]. They ... There’s no word for what they 
do. To say that they know is completely inadequate” (502). Here Butler even interferes in the 
language we use to make epistemological claims. Elsewhere, in Imago, a resister asks Jodahs: 
“Do you ever think of yourself or your kind as Human?” Jodahs responds echoing Lorde, 
“We feel our humanity” (531, italics added). Questions of identity are thus not solved on the 
basis of rational thought but on the basis of feeling, sensual experience, and affect.  
 The second theory of the erotic is somewhat harder to pin down than Lorde’s. It 
concerns what Eric White has called the “Erotics of Becoming,” a Deleuzian, sensual delight 
in the constant flux of evolution. White looks at three evolutionist narratives – The Island of 
Dr Moreau, The Thing and Lilith’s Brood, and argues that only Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy 
“can in fact be said to intervene in and reverse a tradition of paranoiac responses to evolution 
in which Nature in effect persecutes Culture,” by depicting change affirmatively, even though 
it reserves a critical attitude with regard to the more controversial aspects that accompany the 
change (White). White astutely notes that, indeed, although Butler is fairly unforgiving of 
humankind’s depravity, in the character of Gabriel, a former actor, she does imagine a 
“mechanism” whereby humans can be said to produce difference without Oankali help. 
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Acting and becoming other can be said to both occupy a space on the same spectrum of the 
erotics of becoming. Moreover, when Gabriel performs in front of Akin the latter draws a 
parallel between acting and nonverbal Oankali communication. He explains that acting, 
because it expertly conjures up specific feelings, can be understood as a cognitive tool. 
“Sometimes you have to remember a feeling you haven’t had for a long time and bring it back 
so you can transmit it to someone else or use a feeling you have about one thing to help 
someone understand something else” (Adulthood Rites 409).  
 Ronald Bogue, who has written more explicitly about Deleuze and sexuality, argues 
that the concept of polysexuality that Deleuze and Guattari subscribe to in Anti-Oedipus is 
best explored in Butler’s Lilith’s Brood. This trilogy, he writes, undermines the same three 
common preconceptions about sex in psychoanalytical theory that Deleuze and Guattari seek 
to dismantle. Firstly, there is the notion that the sole function of sex is procreation and that 
heterosexual genital sex is therefore the norm; secondly according to psychoanalytical theory 
“the sexual and the social are separate domains” (the transgression of which can only be 
pathological); and thirdly, psychoanalytical theory supports the notion that human sexuality 
has nothing to do with the non-human world (Bogue 34). Although Lilith’s Brood seems to be 
highly invested in sex because of its procreative function, this is actually not the case, for 
procreation – the planting of the fertilized ovum in the womb – need not occur during the sex 
act. Ooloi can fertilize females merely by establishing a physical connection with their 
sensory tentacle. Whether this already counts as sex is dubious because the same action is 
used for gathering information, communication and even administering the (non)lethal ooloi 
sting.
6
  
 The Oankali “deep touch” as it is sometimes referred to (Imago 535) is used for a 
whole host of functions, most of which occur in the social realm, like communication and 
                                                          
6
 Ooloi are the only sex that can choose whether to kill by stinging a target or merely to subdue it.  
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sharing information about new biological discoveries. This deep touch generates pleasure 
whether the ooloi are investigating something or healing someone, and this pleasure is looped 
via neurochemical connection between mates, thus becoming one shared resource. As Bogue 
writes,  
it is not clear that the healing pleasure is qualitatively different from the pleasure 
induced through sexual activity [...]. It would seem, then, that the distinction between 
sexual and non-sexual pleasure, at least in ooloi relations with humans and Oankali, is 
provisional at best. (40-41) 
Moreover, Butler “[undoes] the privilege of genital over other erogenous zones;” “alien sex is 
polymorphously perverse. Erotic intensity is evenly dispersed across the surface of the body” 
(White). In its circumvention of genital focus, Oankali sexuality also manages to sidestep 
phallocentric conceptions of sexuality. Feminist ideas do not only inflect conceptions of 
sexuality, but also the representation of the transmission of knowledge in Imago. The organ 
that grants the ooloi their special talent for the manipulation of biological matter is called the 
“yashi.” When an ooloi comes of age and has found its mates, its parent ooloi will transmit all 
the genetic information it has collected over the years to its child. This experience is entirely 
overwhelming and is explained using the analogy of a baby suckling on his, her or its 
mother’s breast (Imago 693).  
 This experience of being inundated with information about former generations, which 
Jodahs compares to “having billions of strangers screaming from inside you for your 
individual attention,” is according to Belk, 
a  kind of race consciousness. Jodahs is able to see back through this race 
consciousness in ways which suggest that if humans understood the tremendous 
changes the species has already experienced in order to become the species, then we 
would not fear species-level changes, we would embrace them. Who wants to be 
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trapped in the human shell on Mars when she could be traversing the universe and 
sharing her body with the stars? (380) 
Belk foregrounds an important point: although the human colony on Mars has been 
established there is a reason why Imago is set on earth, where the Oankali and humanity live 
side by side. The trilogy is gruelingly pocked with instances of human cruelty and 
xenophobia. The last novel in the trilogy is something of a relief in its optimism. Whatever it 
is about Lilith’s Brood that has led scholars to label it as utopian, it is surely to be found in 
Imago, where it becomes obvious that the Oankali, and to some extent the humans who have 
taken their lessons to heart, do not suffer because of a rigid mind-body dualism, and where 
what is conceived as feminine is not demonized or discarded as unproductive. As became 
evident from a passage quoted earlier, the Oankali treat others like groups. They both 
acknowledge multiplicity, or fragmentation, in themselves and others but they enable their 
constituent parts to engage in dialogue with each other in order to form a consensus.  
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Conclusion 
I began this thesis by noting Butler’s intentions to dismantle the dichotomy between 
the heroic slave and the contemptible house slave whose ostensible complicity with her 
master puts her beyond the pale of redemption. I think she has done just that by creating a 
narrative that demonstrates the manifestations and limitations of violent and non-violent 
resistance within complex networks of power. Moreover, in her defamiliarization of slavery 
she has created a more flexible understanding of it, unmoored from stubbornly 
conventionalized conceptions or visualizations of slavery that refer consistently back to the 
American antebellum kind. Although the historical knowledge of the specific kind of slavery 
that was practiced in antebellum America is without a doubt highly important, especially as 
the institution informs so many of the present-day’s social problems, to delimit one’s 
understanding of slavery in this way would blind us to ways in which its legacies operate 
more insidiously, more ambiguously, and more pervasively in society today in general. 
Butler’s portrayal of slavery as an advanced case of domestication – as in the cultivation of 
Lilith’s dependency and docility in Dawn – makes it highly relevant for animal studies. On 
the other hand, thinking of slavery as a form of parasitism, a thought that is certainly 
entertained in Lilith’s Brood, leads to lines of thought that reverse the logic of dependence 
that imbues the notion of slavery as domestication, presenting the master as the one in need, 
relying on its host/slave body for sustenance and futurity.  
Most importantly, however, what Butler has done in Lilith’s Brood is expose the 
tension between the discourse of posthumanism and the discourse of the slave-narrative 
imbued as it is with humanist values. This is an intuitively dangerous step to make. Humanist 
values still engender ample respect and have led us to conceive of ideas like human rights. 
Posthumanism’s conceptual daring, however, exists precisely in its challenge of such 
eminently received ideas. Posthumanist conclusions are never without a realistic 
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understanding of the necessity of sacrifice. Breaking down the familiar humanist 
understanding of  subjectivity and agency constitutes an aggressive assault on some of our 
most commonplace values. Thus a reading of Lilith’s Brood is anything but pleasant. Lilith’s 
Brood shows how untenable autonomy is in a world where one person’s freedom – say to 
refuse the Oankali’s offer – compromises another person’s freedom – to life and futurity. 
Instead Lilith’s Brood proposes that we acknowledge our collective responsibility to other 
living creatures and the environment, and that we take action accordingly. Moreover, in terms 
of understanding the self and our subjectivity, Lilith’s Brood does away with the humanist 
understanding of the subject as authentic: unique and uninscribed by its environment. Instead 
it proposes the example of Akin, who, because of his liminal status as a construct is both 
familiar and strange, and a vision of what humanity could mean if we were to acknowledge 
the myth of authenticity.  It is not as if the posthuman characters in Lilith’s Brood prefigure 
the next stage of humanity that is yet to be born, rather, they are vehicles of identification 
which enable us to perceive what being human really entails. In doing so they demonstrate 
that the notion of the humanist subject was from its inception an unfair abstraction, as well as 
a normative and exclusionary concept. Finally in foregrounding an alternative epistemology 
that grounds knowledge in the body, and in lived experience Lilith’s Brood undermines the 
notion of rationality that serves as the last cornerstone of the humanist subject. 
While a reconfiguration of the notion of the human can spell great good for people 
wanting to live a more connected, more sustainable, more ethical life, these same people are 
bound to be affected by the curtailment of Lilith’s freedom and her consequent suffering 
throughout the series. Nevertheless this can be construed as necessary, the birth pangs that 
accompany every major transition or revolution – including a posthumanist one. Butler dwells 
on this pain and suffering, perhaps too long for those readers looking to entertain their 
transhumanist daydreams, but in dwelling on this pain Butler makes an important argument. 
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Change does not come easy. Change demands its martyrs. Ultimately, however, change is 
good. In Adulthood Rites when Akin is asked about his painful experience of connecting 
neurologically with the Oankali ship – an entity whose consciousness is entirely different 
from his own - he summarizes quite well what also seems to undergird much posthumanist 
thought: that despite the pain “It’s worth what it costs, worth reaching for” (Adulthood Rites 
444). 
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